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Acquisitions by larger firms seem to generate less wealth for acquirer stockholders than 
acquisitions by smaller firms. In this paper, we re-examine the ‘size effect’, but separately for 
serial and non-serial acquisition. We find sample-selection bias results in a spurious size 
effect for non-serial deals, but that it does not affect the size effect for serial deals. Our results 
suggest this is because smaller non-serial acquirers require greater time-varying synergies 
than larger non-serial acquirers. In contrast, larger serial acquirers are associated with 
persistent synergies to a greater extent than smaller serial acquirers. Our findings are 
consistent with rational managerial behavior.   
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The efficiency of the market for corporate acquisitions can be impeded by many 
factors. Acquirer size seems to be an important factor. 1  In a seminal study, Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that, overall, acquisitions by larger firms generate 
significantly less wealth for acquirer stockholders than acquisitions by smaller firms. They 
attribute the ‘size effect’ to stockholder expectation that acquisitions by larger firms are more 
prone to overpayment because of managerial hubris.2 Other studies suggest a similar line of 
reasoning to explain why it is that, no matter acquirer size, acquisitions by the same firm, or 
manager, in relatively close succession (serial deals) successively generate significantly less 
wealth for acquirer stockholders (see, for example, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005; 
Billett and Qian, 2008). That is, serial deals imbue managers with increasing levels of 
overconfidence, leading them to increasingly overestimate their ability to generate synergies. 
Furthermore, Karolyi, Liao, and Loureiro (2015) find that, no matter acquirer size, serial 
deals generate significantly less wealth for acquirer stockholders than non-serial deals. 
However, they attribute the ‘serial effect’ less to managerial hubris and more to a pursuit of 
managerial self-interest. 
 In this paper, we re-examine the size effect, but separately for serial and non-serial 
acquisition. The contribution of our study is to explore possible connections between the size 
                                                          
1 Just how important a factor is acquirer size seems to depend on the extent of political connections and 
rules governing the use of anti-takeover mechanisms in the country of acquirer jurisdiction (see 
Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011, 2014).  
2  Managerial behavior of this irrational kind is variously labelled as “hubris” (see Roll, 1986), 
“overconfidence” (see Malmendier and Tate, 2008), and “narcissism” (see Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert, and 
Roll, 2016) in the literature on corporate acquisitions. Offenburg (2009) provides post-acquisition evidence 
to suggest the size effect also manifests from a pursuit of managerial self-interest (for example, power, 
private benefits of control, and entrenchment). However, although a manager imbued with hubris is less 
likely to have selfish intentions, the outcome for stockholder wealth is likely to be similar to the case of a 
self-serving manager.       
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effect and these different types of acquisition. Central to our study is the question of whether 
or not the size effect is a spurious result of sample-selection bias. That is, of not taking into 
account the correlation between acquirer size and unobservable factors jointly affecting 
acquisition likelihood and the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. Crucially, by 
separating serial and non-serial deals, we permit unobservable factors and the correlation to 
depend on the type of deal. The findings from our study suggest reinterpretations of both the 
size and serial effects consistent with rational managerial behavior. 
We begin by examining whether or not there is a separate size effect for serial and 
non-serial deals, but without, at this stage, accounting for the possibility of sample-selection 
bias. For a large sample of acquisitions and firms, and after controlling for a raft of acquirer 
and deal characteristics (including both absolute and relative deal size), our results reveal that 
both serial and non-serial deals by larger firms generate significantly less wealth for acquirer 
stockholders than corresponding deals by smaller firms. However, the size effect is most 
pronounced for serial deals. Needless to say, and consistent with the finding of Moeller et al. 
(2004), an overall size effect is also plainly evident when we pool deals.  
Next, we address the question of whether or not the size effect is a spurious result of 
sample-selection bias. Three interrelated conditions are necessary for this to be a possibility.3 
First, firm size needs to jointly affect acquisition likelihood and the wealth effect for acquirer 
stockholders. If, by virtue of size, larger firms have more financial and operational capacity 
for acquisition than smaller firms, the size effect results from a sample characterized by more 
censoring of smaller firms. Second, unobservable factors, like potential synergies and 
managerial hubris/self-interest, also need to jointly affect acquisition likelihood and the 
                                                          
3 Certo, Busenbark, Woo, and Semadeni (2016) provide a general appreciation of the necessary interplay 
between the three conditions. See also Li and Prabhala (2007) for an extensive review of approaches to 
address sample-selection bias in research on corporate finance. Our study is one of the first to address the 
question of whether or not the size effect is a spurious result of sample-selection bias.       
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wealth effect for acquirer stockholders.4 A positive (negative) joint effect of unobservable 
factors is more likely indicative of potential synergies (managerial hubris/self-interest) that 
increase(s) acquisition likelihood and also increase (decreases) the wealth effect for acquirer 
stockholders.5 Third, acquirer size needs to be correlated with the joint effect of unobservable 
factors. A positive (negative) correlation in combination with a positive joint effect of 
unobservable factors is more likely indicative of larger (smaller) acquirers requiring more 
potential synergies. Alternatively, a positive (negative) correlation in combination with a 
negative joint effect of unobservable factors is more likely indicative of larger (smaller) 
acquirers being more prone to the adverse consequences (overpayment in particular) of 
managerial hubris/self-interest. Without accounting for the positive (negative) correlation 
there is potential for downward (upward) bias in the size effect. Moreover, it is possible that 
both the direction and significance of each condition are different for serial and non-serial 
deals. 
As such, we use sample-selection models (adding relevant control variables and 
exclusion restrictions to the, first stage, prediction of acquisition likelihood) to examine each 
of the three conditions separately for serial and non-serial deals. First, our results reveal that 
larger firms are significantly more likely to become both serial and non-serial acquirers than 
smaller firms. However, more censoring of smaller firms is most pronounced for firms that 
become serial acquirers. Second, we observe a positive joint effect of unobservable factors 
for both serial and non-serial deals. However, the joint effect of unobservable factors, more 
likely indicative of potential synergies, is only significant for non-serial deals. Third, we find 
the size effect is only significant for serial deals. The size effect for serial deals is identical to 
                                                          
4 Although we can proxy for these unobservable factors, the proxies are unlikely to capture all information 
about potential synergies and all traits of irrational/self-serving managerial behavior. Here, by design, 
these unobservable factors are time-varying. This is possible, at least in part, because managers can do 
acquisitions at the helm of different firms.   
5 As explained in the next section, a negative joint effect of unobservable factors is more likely indicative 
of managerial hubris than a pursuit of managerial self-interest because the UK is the country of acquirer 
jurisdiction chosen for our study.  
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that estimated without a sample-selection model. We infer from a no longer significant size 
effect for non-serial deals that acquirer size and potential synergies are negatively correlated. 
The negative correlation is to an extent that without a sample-selection model there is 
significant upward bias in an otherwise non-evident size effect for non-serial deals. Our 
results highlight a subtle point about sample-selection bias. Although more censoring of 
smaller firms is a necessary condition to potentially show a spurious size effect, the other 
conditions are more likely to be significant when there is more moderate censoring of smaller 
firms. 
Interestingly, when we disregard whether firms become serial or non-serial acquirers 
and only model overall acquisition likelihood, the direction and significance of the necessary 
conditions to show a spurious size effect are more in line with those for non-serial deals. This 
is so much so that, with a sample-selection model, the size effect is also no longer evident 
when we pool deals.6 We draw the following inferences from our sample-selection results: 
(1) larger firms have more financial and operational capacity for acquisition, but serial 
acquisition in particular, than smaller firms; (2) smaller acquirers, but smaller non-serial 
acquirers in particular, require more potential synergies than larger acquirers. With greater 
uncertainty associated with being a smaller acquirer, it is rational for smaller acquirers, but 
smaller non-serial acquirers in particular, to require greater time-varying synergies. 
Our sample-selection results are robust to alternative estimates of firm size, the wealth 
effect for acquirer stockholders, and the joint effect of unobservable factors. In contrast to 
firm size, our results for the control variables also included in both stages of the sample-
selection models reveal scant evidence of significant bias (in the, second stage, determination 
of the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders) relative to those estimated without sample-
                                                          
6 In a parallel study, Austin, Harris, and O’Brien (2017) also find an overall size effect to no longer be 
evident with a sample-selection model. However, they do not examine the size effect separately for serial 
and non-serial deals.   
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selection models. With regard to the serial effect documented in Karolyi et al. (2015), we too 
find that, no matter acquirer size, serial deals generate significantly less wealth for acquirer 
stockholders than non-serial deals. Needless to say, because the serial-deal variable has 
relevance for the determination of the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, but not for the 
prediction of acquisition likelihood, the serial effect is significant with or without a sample-
selection model. 
 In the last part of the study, we turn to explore the possibility that the size effect for 
serial deals is more nuanced. Macias, Rau, and Stouraitis (2016) find serial acquirers have 
different profiles. In particular, not all serial acquirers have a tendency to do acquisitions in 
especially close succession (block deals). If smaller firms have relatively less financial and 
operational capacity for block deals than non-block serial deals, accounting for these different 
profiles, and the associated rates of more smaller-firm censoring, has the potential to show it 
is misleading to focus on the overall size effect for serial deals. We therefore use sample-
selection models to examine the size effect separately for block and non-block serial deals. 
Our results reveal that for both profiles the direction and significance of the necessary 
conditions to show a spurious size effect are similar to when pooling serial deals. 
Furthermore, we find that, no matter acquirer size, block deals generate insignificantly less 
wealth for acquirer stockholders than non-block serial deals.   
 Also, Golubov, Yawson, and Zhang (2015) find persistent factors explain variation in 
the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders to a greater extent than, observable, time-varying 
factors (including acquirer size) emphasized in earlier studies of serial deals (see, for example, 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Klasa and Stegemoller, 2007). If acquirer size is also 
correlated with persistent factors, without accounting for the positive (negative) correlation 
there is additional potential for downward (upward) bias in the size effect for serial deals. We 
therefore add fixed effects for serial acquirers to a sample-selection model to account for 
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unobservable factors, like potential synergies and managerial hubris/self-interest, in both 
persistent and time-varying form.7 Our results reveal that without accounting for both forms 
of correlation there is significant downward bias in the size effect for serial deals. However, 
we attribute the bias in full to omitted persistent factors because the joint effect of 
unobservable, time-varying, factors remains insignificant after adding fixed effects for serial 
acquirers.  
Moreover, by fixating on the average size effect for serial deals, we assume that it is 
constant in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. This is possibly an incorrect 
assumption, especially given that we suspect larger serial acquirers are associated with 
persistent factors to a greater extent than smaller serial acquirers. If potential synergies 
(managerial hubris/self-interest) more likely account(s) for larger serial acquirers being more 
associated with persistent factors, we expect to observe that the size effect for serial deals is 
increasing (decreasing) in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. We therefore use 
sample-selection models to simultaneously examine the size effect for serial deals across 
quartiles of the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. Our results reveal that the size effect 
for serial deals is increasing in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, and that it is 
insignificant in the lower quartile consisting only of wealth-destructive deals.8 We account 
for this monotonic relationship as more likely resulting from larger serial acquirers being 
more associated with persistent synergies than smaller serial acquirers. This is possible, at 
least in part, because the joint effect of unobservable, time-varying, factors is insignificant in 
all quartiles of the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. 
                                                          
7  It is possible for potential synergies and irrational/self-serving managerial behavior to manifest in 
persistent form, at least in part, because managers can do serial deals either by remaining at the helm of the 
same firm, or by moving to firms in which these persistent factors already manifest as a result of earlier 
serial deals.      
8 In another parallel study, Schneider and Spalt (2017) find the size effect is reversed (that is, turns 
significantly in favor of larger acquirers) for wealth-destructive deals. They suggest that, overall, both 
wealth destruction and creation is scaled down for larger acquirers. However, our otherwise similar results, 
together with our earlier findings, suggest an altogether different interpretation of the size effect for serial 
deals alone.             
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Our additional findings for the size effect for serial deals are consistent with rational 
managerial behavior of a kind construed by Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Aktas, de 
Bodt, and Roll (2009, 2011, 2013). That is, managers become better equipped to generate 
potential synergies with each successive deal. Although this is reflected in the wealth effect 
for acquirer stockholders, stockholder expectation is that persistent synergies also necessitate 
managers to bid more aggressively with each successive deal. The contribution of our study 
is to suggest that, all other things equal, this trade-off is most pronounced for larger serial 
acquirers. Furthermore, a similar line of reasoning can also potentially explain the serial 
effect. That is, again all other things equal, the serial effect is possible, at least in part, 
because we suspect all serial acquirers are associated with persistent synergies, and, hence, 
the trade-off in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, to a greater extent than time-
varying synergies.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample of 
acquisitions and firms. Sections 3 and 4 present and discuss our results for the size effect with 
and without sample-selection bias, respectively. Section 5 presents and discusses our 
additional results for the size effect for serial deals. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Sample of acquisitions and firms 
2.1. Sample construction 
To construct the sample of acquisitions and firms, we first obtain data from the SDC 
Platinum database for all deals announced by UK listed firms during the period 1989-2014. 
The acquisitions that meet our selection criteria described later are then merged with the 
annual populations of listed firms reconstructed from live and dead constituents of the 
Datastream database. However, we exclude firms with an Industry Classification Benchmark 
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(ICB) super-sector related to either financials or utilities because acquisitions by firms in 
these industries attract more public scrutiny.  
There are two interrelated reasons for why we choose to conduct the study on UK, 
rather than US, firms. First, Companies Acts in the UK render managerial entrenchment less 
effective than is the case in the US, because of the relative ease at which pre-emptive 
antitakeover provisions (for example, staggered boards and poison pills) can be rescinded by 
stockholders. This feature of UK company law is potentially important in the context of our 
study because entrenchment has been shown to be related to poorer acquisitions. In particular, 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012) find that 
acquisitions by US firms with more entrenchment provisions generate significantly less 
wealth for acquirer stockholders than those by firms with fewer entrenchment provisions. 
Second, and again in contrast to the situation in the US, Companies Acts in the UK make it 
mandatory for acquisitions with a deal value of at least 25 percent of the would-be acquirer’s 
value to first gain approval from a majority of stockholders. In this regard, Becht, Polo, and 
Rossi (2016) find acquisitions by UK firms that cross the relative-size threshold generate 
significantly more wealth for acquirer stockholders than would have been the case had 
stockholder approval not been necessary. 
The evidence would therefore seem to suggest company law in the UK has more 
potential than is the case in the US to reduce managerial opportunities for relatively large 
acquisitions that are perceived by stockholders to be from a pursuit of self-interest (for 
example, power, private benefits of control, and entrenchment). If so, for the UK, potential 
synergies and managerial hubris are more probable unobservable factors jointly affecting 
acquisition likelihood and, oppositely, the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. Although a 
manager imbued with hubris is less likely to have selfish intentions, the outcome for 
stockholder wealth is likely to be similar to the case of a self-serving manager. However, for 
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the UK, a negative joint effect of unobservable factors is more likely to be indicative of 
managerial hubris than a pursuit of managerial self-interest. 
Our criteria for selecting the acquisitions for inclusion in the sample start out 
essentially the same as those in the closely-related study of Moeller et al. (2004). That is, the 
acquisitions comprise deals for public, private, and subsidiary firms. All deals require the 
acquirer to purchase at least 50 percent of the share capital of the firm being acquired and to 
end up with outright ownership. We also drop acquisitions with a size of less than US$ 1 
million in real (2014) terms and deals with a size of less than 1 percent of the market value of 
the acquirer.9 However, we include both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, whereas 
Moeller et al. (2004) only select domestic deals. The reasons for this departure from their 
selection criteria are that the main objective of our study is to not only re-examine the size 
effect, but also to do so separately for serial and non-serial acquisition. By extending the 
sample to cross-border deals, which account for 31.1 percent of the total acquisitions, we 
guarantee to have as close to possible a full record of the deals for each firm. With the 
exception of Karolyi et al. (2015), who report a similar percentage of cross-border deals for 
acquirers from around the world, other studies classify acquirers as serial acquirers by only 
considering their domestic acquisitions. 
Serial acquirers in our sample range from being “occasional” acquirers (only two 
acquisitions in a three-year period) to being “frequent” acquirers (at least five acquisitions in 
a three-year period), as per the definitions of Fuller et al. (2002) and Golubov et al. (2015). 
However, our definition of a serial deal is such that firms become serial acquirers based on 
                                                          
9 Our proxy for absolute acquisition size, which also serves as the numerator for deal size relative to 
acquirer size, is the deal value times 1
1 ˗ toehold
 , where toehold is the percentage of the share capital of the 
firm being acquired that is already owned by the acquirer. This proxy provides a closer approximation to 
the real size of the firm that is to be integrated into the acquirer. However, instead assuming that toehold is 
zero (results not presented) does not alter our findings discussed later. For the denominator for deal size 
relative to acquirer size, the market value of the acquirer is the market value of equity minus book value of 
equity plus book value of total assets for the fiscal period end before the calendar year of the acquisition 
announcement.     
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only the relative closeness of their current and last acquisitions. This definition (which 
requires us to backtrack to 1986) avoids lookahead bias by not, as in most other studies, 
defining firms as serial acquirers based also on their subsequent acquisitions.10 The definition 
also enables us to end up with a clean as possible set of non-serial deals, which represent the 
first acquisitions of firms for at least a three-year period. 
2.2. Distribution of acquisitions and firms 
Table 1 presents the frequency, aggregate size, and intensity of acquisitions during 
our sample period. The sample comprises a total of 10,384 acquisitions, with an aggregate 
size of US$ 986.6 trillion, by 7,171 acquirers from 42,251 firm calendar years.11  
On deconstructing the sample there are a total of 6,895 (3,489) serial (non-serial) 
deals by 4,265 (3,489) serial (non-serial) acquirers. Furthermore, the aggregate size of serial 
(non-serial) deals amounts to a total of US$ 662.6 (324.0) trillion. Serial acquisition is 
therefore the largest subgroup of our sample based on frequency of deals and acquirers and 
aggregate acquisition size. However, in amounting to a third of all deals, close to half of all 
acquirers, and a third of the aggregate size of all deals, non-serial acquisition is far from 
being an insignificant subgroup of our sample. Based on frequency of deals and acquirers and 
aggregate deal size, serial acquisition peaks during 1997-2000 in what is generally regarded 
as the fifth merger wave. Even so, the aggregate size of serial deals remains relatively high 
through to the financial crisis in 2008. With the exception of the tailend of the fourth merger 
wave of the late 1980s, when a relatively high frequency of firms were doing their first deals 
for at least a three-year period, non-serial acquisition is more evenly distributed than serial 
acquisition.   
                                                          
10 Billet and Qian (2008) also rely on backtracked acquisitions to identify serial acquirers. However, their 
study is different to ours in so far as serial acquirers are defined in terms of managers, rather than firms. 
This approach is unsuitable for a study, like ours, of the size effect because managers can do acquisitions 
at the helm of different firms.           
11 The numbers of observations in subsequent Tables are less than the totals that we report here because of 
insufficient data to construct certain variables. However, the relative proportions of acquirers to firm 
calendar years and of serial and non-serial deals/acquirers remain essentially the same.   
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The last column in Table 1 presents a proxy for the overall intensity of acquisitions 
during our sample period. Studies that attempt to gauge acquisition intensity, such as Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) and Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011), typically resort to proxies 
based on either the number of deals as a proportion of the population of firms or the 
aggregate size of deals as a proportion of the aggregate size of the firm population. However, 
we utilize a combination of these proxies to produce a value-weighted (aggregate deal size 
divided by aggregate market value of firms) proxy for acquisition intensity. Evidencing 
similarities with aspects of the distribution of both serial and non-serial acquisition, overall 
deal intensity is at its highest at the tailend of the fourth merger wave and during the fifth 
merger wave. Furthermore, the overall intensity of acquisitions is at its lowest from the 
financial crisis through to the end of our sample period. 
2.3.  Descriptive statistics for acquirer and deal characteristics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for acquirer and deal characteristics that have 
been shown in other studies of acquisitions (many of which have already been mentioned) to 
explain the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. We provide detailed definitions, and 
timings with respect to calendar (acquisition announcement) years, for the acquirer and deal 
characteristics in Table A1 in the Appendix.   
In the context of re-examining the size effect, the two main variables of interest are 
cumulative abnormal return for acquirer stockholders centered on the acquisition 
announcement date (CAR) and acquirer size (SIZE). CAR averages 1.0 percent across all 
deals. Our mean estimate of the overall wealth effect for acquirer stockholders is almost 
identical to that of Moeller et al. (2004). However, on average, serial deals generate less 
wealth (CAR = 0.7 percent) for acquirer stockholders than non-serial deals (CAR = 1.8 
percent). The difference between the mean wealth effects is significant at the one-percent 
level. This serial effect is also documented by Karolyi et al. (2015). Across all deals and in 
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real (2014) terms, SIZE averages US$ 7,765.1 million based on the market value of the 
acquirer. The difference between the means of SIZE for serial and non-serial deals is positive 
and significant at the one-percent level. Yet, with SIZE averaging US$ 5,946.0 million, non-
serial deals are far from involving small acquirers. Nor do non-serial deals lack sufficient 
SIZE variation (standard deviation = US$ 27,115.3 million) for us to be able to potentially 
detect a size effect for this subgroup of acquisitions.                        
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 also reveal that serial and non-serial 
acquisition differs significantly along many other dimensions. Differences in the other 
acquirer and deal characteristics, which subsequently serve as control variables, reinforce our 
intent to re-examine the size effect separately for serial and non-serial acquisition. 
 
3. Size effect with sample-selection bias 
We first examine whether or not a size effect exists for our sample of acquisitions 
and, new to the literature, whether or not one exists separately for both serial and non-serial 
deals. However, at this initial stage in the analysis we do not account for the possibility that 
any size effect is a spurious result of sample-selection bias. That is, we neither account for 
any effect firm size also has on acquisition likelihood, nor account for any correlation 
between acquirer size and unobservable factors jointly affecting acquisition likelihood and 
the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. 
Table 3 presents coefficients for linear regressions of CAR on SIZE (based on the 
natural logarithm of the market value of the acquirer), and the other acquirer and deal 
characteristics. With the exception of the firm-age variables, we include the other acquirer 
characteristics in industry-adjusted form (at the level of the ICB super-sector). However, 
instead estimating the effects on CAR from these control variables in raw form (results not 
presented) does not alter our findings discussed later. We also control for ICB super-sectors 
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and calendar years. Although standard errors are presented in bootstrapped form, for reasons 
of consistency explained later, significance levels are essentially the same as those that, like 
Moeller et al. (2004), we also estimate with conventional standard errors, which are also 
clustered at the level of the acquirer. Our decision to estimate standard errors in bootstrapped 
form accounts for why a Wald, rather than a conventional (F-), statistic is presented at the 
bottom of each regression to gauge overall model significance. 
The regression results reveal that both serial and non-serial deals by larger firms 
generate significantly less wealth for acquirer stockholders than corresponding acquisitions 
by smaller firms. However, the size effect is more pronounced for serial deals, even though 
the coefficient for SIZE is larger for non-serial deals. Specifically, the size effects for serial 
and non-serial deals are significant at the one- and five-percent levels, respectively. The 
effect of increasing SIZE by as little as US$ 10 million is expected to decrease CAR by as 
much as 1.0 and 1.2 percentage points for serial and non-serial deals, respectively. Compared 
to the averages of CAR for serial and non-serial deals that we reported earlier, both of the 
predicted size effects are economically large.  
Only a small number of control variables gain significance to at least the five-percent 
level. Of the control variables that do, acquisitions for private and subsidiary firms generate 
significantly more wealth for acquirer stockholders than those for public firms. Among other 
studies, these results are consistent with the findings of Chang (1998) for acquisitions as a 
whole and Fuller et al. (2002) for serial deals only. Yet we find that the result also applies to 
non-serial deals. Furthermore, only the effects on CAR from the deal-size variables evidence 
variation between serial and non-serial acquisition. In their re-examination of the size effect 
for acquisitions as a whole, Schneider and Spalt (2017) demonstrate the importance of 
permitting deal size to vary independently of, rather than only relatively to, acquirer size. 
However, we find that both absolute and relative acquisition size affects CAR for serial deals, 
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but that neither proxy for acquisition size affects CAR for non-serial deals. These results 
suggest that for non-serial deals there is little difference between absolute and relative 
acquisition size when it comes to determining the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. For 
serial acquisition, larger deals per se generate significantly more wealth for acquirer 
stockholders than smaller deals, whereas the wealth effect for larger deals in relative terms 
only is significantly less than for correspondingly smaller deals. These results suggest that 
while larger acquisitions in absolute terms have more potential to generate synergies, 
complexities of post-acquisition integration are expected to adversely affect synergies more 
the larger is the acquired firm relative to the acquirer. 
 The last column in Table 3 presents regression results for all deals. Given the results 
for serial and non-serial deals, it is unsurprising that a size effect is also plainly evident when 
we pool acquisitions. Our estimate of the overall size effect is reasonably close to that of 
Moeller et al. (2004). However, unlike them, we add to the regression a binary variable that is 
equal to one for a serial deal and zero for a non-serial deal. The coefficient and significance 
level for this variable reveal that, no matter SIZE and the many control variables, serial deals 
generate significantly less wealth for acquirer stockholders than non-serial deals. Specifically, 
the serial effect is significant at the one-percent level. The effect of changing from a non-
serial deal to a serial deal is expected to decrease CAR by as much as 0.9 percentage points. 
Compared to the average CAR for all deals that we reported earlier, the predicted serial effect 
is economically large. Our multivariate estimate of the serial effect is in line with that of 
Karolyi et al. (2015). 
 
4. Size effect without sample-selection bias 
 We now account for the possibility that the size effects for serial and non-serial 
acquisition found earlier are a spurious result of sample-selection bias. In the first stage of 
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controlling for any sample-selection bias we account for any effect firm size also has on 
acquisition likelihood, and for the possibility that any effect is quite different for serial and 
non-serial deals. Then in the corresponding second stage we account for any correlation 
between acquirer size and unobservable factors jointly affecting acquisition likelihood and 
the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, facets of any sample-selection bias that may also 
vary between serial and non-serial deals.     
4.1. Acquisition likelihood    
 Table A2 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for firm and firm-
environment characteristics that have been shown in other studies (see, for example, Harford, 
1999; Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen, 2009; Owen and Yawson, 2010; Cai, Song, and Walkling, 
2011; Arikan and Stulz, 2016) to explain acquisition likelihood. We provide detailed 
definitions, and timings with respect to calendar years, for the firm and firm-environment 
characteristics in Table A1. The firm-environment characteristics are intended to capture 
structural aspects of the ICB super-sectors in which firms operate, as well as industry and 
general merger waves. 
In the context of re-examining the size effect, the main variable of interest is firm size 
(SIZE). Across all firm calendar years and in real (2014) terms, SIZE averages US$ 3,849.0 
million based on the market value of the firm. However, the difference between the means of 
SIZE for acquirers as a whole and non-acquirers is positive and significant at the one-percent 
level.  
The descriptive statistics presented in Table A2 also reveal that acquirers as a whole 
and non-acquirers differ significantly along many other dimensions. Differences in the other 
firm and firm-environment characteristics provide justification for our subsequent inclusion 
of the other firm characteristics as control variables, and the firm-environment characteristics 
as a means to satisfy the need for exclusion restrictions, in the first stage of modelling sample 
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selection. In contrast to the situation for acquisition likelihood, we have no similarly strong 
reasons to suspect that the firm-environment characteristics also directly matter when it 
comes to determining the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. 
Table 4 presents average marginal effects for probit regressions for the effect of SIZE 
(based on the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm), and the other firm and firm-
environment characteristics, on acquisition likelihood. The dependent variables are binary 
and equal to one for the type of acquirer and zero for any other firm. With the exception of 
the firm-age variables, we include the other firm characteristics in industry-adjusted form (at 
the level of the ICB super-sector). However, instead estimating the effects on acquisition 
likelihood from these control variables in raw form (results not presented) does not alter our 
findings discussed later. Because of the firm-environment variables we do not also control for 
ICB super-sectors and calendar years. Standard errors are presented in bootstrapped form, 
again for reasons explained later, and clustered at the level of the firm. 
 The regression results reveal that larger firms are significantly more likely to become 
both serial and non-serial acquirers than smaller firms. However, the effect of SIZE is more 
pronounced for serial acquisition likelihood. Specifically, the effect of SIZE on both serial 
and non-serial acquisition likelihood is significant at the one-percent level, but the difference 
between the effects also gains significance at the one-percent level. The effect of increasing 
SIZE by as little as US$ 10 million is expected to increase serial and non-serial acquisition 
likelihood by as much as 5.9 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. Compared to the actual 
rates of serial and non-serial acquisition (10.1 and 8.3 percent, respectively, as computed 
from the totals presented at the bottom of Table 1 by expressing the numbers of serial and 
non-serial acquirers as a percentage of the number of firms), both of the predicted effects of 
SIZE on acquisition likelihood are economically large.  
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Most of the control variables and exclusion restrictions gain significance to at least 
the five-percent level. Of the control variables that do, acquirers as a whole are significantly 
more likely than all other firms to have higher sales growth and Return On Assets (but mainly 
because of serial acquirers), and to have higher ROA volatility (but more because of non-
serial acquirers) and lower leverage ratios (but mainly because of serial acquirers). Although 
the firm-age and cash-liquidity variables are positively but insignificantly related to 
acquisition likelihood as a whole, we find that non-serial acquirers are significantly more 
likely than all other firms to be among the oldest firms and to have higher liquidity ratios. 
However, we also find that serial acquirers are significantly more likely than all other firms to 
have lower liquidity ratios.  
Of the exclusion restrictions that gain significance, acquirers as a whole (but mainly 
because of serial acquirers) are significantly more likely than all other firms to operate in an 
ICB super-sector for which both median firm age and firm-age dispersion are higher and 
sales concentration is lower, and to be in both an industry and a general (deal) merger wave. 
Although the industry-duration restriction is positively but insignificantly related to 
acquisition likelihood as a whole, we find that non-serial acquirers are significantly more 
likely than all other firms to operate in an ICB super-sector with a longer elapsed time since 
the last acquisition (with a deal size of at least US$ 10 million) by any firm in the industry. 
This latter result suggests that non-serial acquirers favor more stable industry conditions.                                  
 The last column in Table 4 presents regression results for all acquirers. Given the 
results for serial and non-serial acquirers, it is unsurprising that a positive effect of SIZE on 
acquisition likelihood is also plainly evident when we pool acquirers. Our new findings imply 
that, no matter other firm and firm-environment characteristics, larger firms have more 
financial and operational capacity for acquisition, but in particular for serial acquisition, than 
smaller firms. If SIZE affects acquisition likelihood and not only the wealth effect for 
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acquirer stockholders, the size effects that we found earlier manifest from samples 
characterized by more censoring of smaller firms. This concern is especially pertinent for the 
subgroup of acquirers that do serial deals.  
However, on its own this condition is insufficient to show a spurious size effect. The 
other necessary and interrelated conditions are for acquirer size, as a consequence of more 
censoring of smaller firms, to be substantially correlated with unobservable, and thus far 
omitted, factors that jointly and significantly affect acquisition likelihood and the wealth 
effect for acquirer stockholders. These unobservable factors are conceivably related to 
potential synergies and managerial hubris, acquisition drivers that are time-varying, at least in 
part, either because different managers can do deals at the helm of the same firm, or because 
these drivers do not persist even with the same manager at the helm. Although the many firm 
characteristics that we include as control variables may also proxy for these unobservable 
factors, the proxies are unlikely to capture all information about potential synergies and all 
traits of irrational managerial behavior.  
In a sample-selection model (see Heckman, 1979), the joint effect of unobservable 
factors can be estimated by utilizing an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) that, in the context of our 
study, is computed from the first-stage regressions of acquisition likelihood and then added to 
the corresponding second-stage regressions of the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. A 
positive (negative) coefficient for the IMR would more likely be indicative of potential 
synergies (managerial hubris) that increase(s) acquisition likelihood and increase (decreases) 
the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. Given we find firm and firm-environment 
characteristics affect serial and non-serial acquisition likelihood to varying extents and in 
different ways, it is possible that both the coefficient and significance level for the IMR, and 
the extent of any correlation between acquirer size and the IMR, are also quite different for 
serial and non-serial deals.        
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4.2. Wealth effect for acquirer stockholders  
 Table 5 presents coefficients for linear regressions of CAR on SIZE equivalent to 
those presented earlier, except that now we add the IMR to generate pseudo sample-selection 
models. We follow Warusawitharana (2008), but in a different context of utilizing pseudo 
sample-selection models, in having to estimate standard errors in bootstrapped form because 
the IMR is computed from the first-stage regressions at the level of the firm and then added 
to the corresponding second-stage regressions at the level of the deal. 
 The sample-selection results reveal that the effect of the IMR on CAR is positive for 
both serial and non-serial deals. However, the IMR only gains significance to at least the 
five-percent level for non-serial deals. Furthermore, adding the IMR to the second-stage 
regression for non-serial deals gains 1.1 percentage points of model explanatory power, as 
compared to an adjusted R-squared of 5.9 percent (presented at the bottom of Table 3) for the 
corresponding ordinary linear regression. These results suggest that, no matter the type of 
deal, unobservable factors related to potential synergies are more likely to be perceived by 
the market as the dominant driver of acquisition, as reflected in the wealth effect for acquirer 
stockholders. That is, even for serial deals, a typical acquisition is not seen to be more prone 
to the adverse consequences (in particular, overpayment) of unobservable factors related to 
managerial hubris; otherwise we would expect to observe a negative relationship between 
CAR and the IMR.    
Furthermore, we now find that only serial deals by larger firms generate significantly 
less wealth for acquirer stockholders than corresponding acquisitions by smaller firms. 
Specifically, for serial deals, the coefficient and significance level for SIZE are equivalent to 
those that we found earlier. For non-serial deals, a no longer significant size effect implies 
that SIZE and the IMR are negatively correlated. The correlation is substantial enough that in 
omitting the joint effect of unobservable factors more likely related to potential synergies, as 
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we have done thus far, for non-serial deals, the negative relationship between CAR and SIZE 
is shown to be overstated to an extent of being spurious. These results also reveal a nuance in 
situations that potentially involve sample-selection bias. That is, in the context of our study, 
although more censoring of smaller firms is a necessary first condition to show a spurious 
size effect, the other two interrelated conditions (the need for the IMR to be significant, and 
for there to be substantial correlation between SIZE and the IMR) are only more likely to 
manifest when there is more moderate censoring of smaller firms, as was earlier found to be 
the case for the subgroup of acquirers doing non-serial deals. 
The last column in Table 5 presents sample-selection results for all deals. Given the 
results for serial and non-serial deals and the higher frequency for serial deals we reported 
earlier, it is somewhat surprising that a size effect is also no longer evident when we pool 
acquisitions. However, the effect of the IMR on CAR for acquisitions as a whole, while also 
positive, is smaller and less significant than that for non-serial deals. Our new findings imply 
that, no matter other acquirer and deal characteristics, smaller acquirers, but in particular 
smaller non-serial acquirers, require more potential synergies than larger acquirers. With 
greater uncertainty associated with being a smaller acquirer, it is rational for smaller acquirers, 
but in particular for smaller non-serial acquirers, to require greater potential synergies. 
Surprisingly, in contrast to SIZE, the effects on CAR from the control variables that 
we also include in both stages of estimating the pseudo sample-selection models are generally 
consistent with those (mainly non-effects) found earlier. That is, even for non-serial 
acquisition and acquisition as a whole, the effects on CAR from these control variables are 
largely immune to sample-selection bias. The one main exception is the effect on CAR from 
firm age, which now gains significance for non-serial deals and in a way that moderately 
older firms generate more wealth for acquirer stockholders than younger firms. Furthermore, 
but unsurprisingly, the effects on CAR from the deal characteristics that we can only include 
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in the second stage of estimating the pseudo sample-selection models also remain essentially 
the same as those found earlier, including the serial (deal) effect for all deals in the last 
column in Table 5.         
4.3. Robustness tests 
 We subject the sample-selection results to a battery of robustness tests. Panels A-D in 
Table A3 in the Appendix present coefficients for sample-selection models of CAR on SIZE. 
For reasons of brevity, we only present re-estimates for the main relationship of interest. 
However, re-estimates of the effects on CAR from the other acquirer and deal characteristics 
do not alter our prior findings for these control variables.  
In regard to Panel A in Table A3, SIZE is thus far based on the market value of the 
acquirer, consistent with the main proxy of Moeller et al. (2004) for acquirer size. However, 
it is possible, but more so for serial acquirers, that the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders 
is partially anticipated in the market capitalization of the acquirer. To address this concern, in 
Panel A, we instead base SIZE (and SIZE_MEDIAN in the first-stage regressions of 
acquisition likelihood, re-estimates of which are not presented) on the book value of the 
acquirer (but with all else unchanged). In regard to Panel B in Table A3, CAR is thus far 
estimated with a market model, consistent with the main proxy of Moeller et al. (2004) for 
the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. The main concern is that there may be 
confounding events in the estimation periods before acquisition announcement dates; in 
particular, past acquisitions in the case of serial acquirers. Therefore, in Panel B, we instead 
estimate CAR with a market-adjusted model (but with all else unchanged) and thus without 
the need for an estimation period. 
In regard to Panel C in Table A3, the IMR is thus far computed from the first-stage 
regressions of acquisition likelihood in which the dependent variables are binary and equal to 
one for the type of acquirer and zero for any other firm. This regression design guarantees we 
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always include all firms active in a given calendar year; that is, not only in the regression of 
acquisition likelihood as a whole, but also in the regressions of serial and non-serial 
acquisition likelihood. However, the IMR, and, hence, the correlation between SIZE and the 
IMR, may be quite different were we always to permit only non-acquirers to be control firms 
in a given calendar year. To address this concern, in Panel C, we instead utilize this 
regression design for serial and non-serial acquisition (but with all else unchanged). Lastly, in 
regard to Panel D in Table A3, we have thus far estimated pseudo sample-selection models 
because the IMR is computed from the first-stage regressions at the level of the firm and then 
added to the corresponding second-stage regressions at the level of the deal. This model 
design guarantees that we always include all deals by the same acquirer in a given calendar 
year. Yet, other than for reasons of consistency with serial acquisition and acquisition as a 
whole, this econometric treatment is not required for non-serial acquisition because the levels 
of the firm and deal are indistinguishable. Therefore, in Panel D, we estimate a conventional 
sample-selection model for non-serial acquisition, which means that standard errors no longer 
need to be bootstrapped (2,000 times). 
 None of the robustness tests alter our prior findings for the size effect. The same is 
true for the serial (deal) effect for all deals in the last columns in Panels A and B in Table A3. 
Furthermore, the robustness tests in all but Panel B also require us to re-estimate the first-
stage regressions of acquisition likelihood (re-estimates not presented). However, none of the 
robustness tests alter our prior findings for the effects of firm and firm-environment 
characteristics on acquisition likelihood.                             
 
5. Additional results for the size effect for serial acquisition 
 Thus far our findings suggest a possible connection between a size effect for non-
serial, but not for serial, acquisition and the omission of unobservable, time-varying, factors 
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related to potential synergies. We next consider why it is that the size effect for serial 
acquisition is apparently immune to this sample-selection bias. 
5.1. Block and non-block acquisition 
 We now suspect that the interrelated conditions necessary to show a spurious size 
effect are only more likely to manifest when there is more moderate censoring of smaller 
firms, as was earlier found not to be the case for the subgroup of acquirers doing serial deals. 
However, serial acquirers may be more heterogeneous than we have thus far assumed. Indeed, 
the findings of Macias et al. (2016) strongly suggest that serial acquirers cannot be profiled as 
a whole. In particular, not all serial acquirers do current and past acquisitions in especially 
close, or block, succession. Therefore, although we suspected earlier that larger firms have 
more financial and operational capacity for serial acquisition than smaller firms, more 
moderate censoring of smaller firms may occur in a subgroup of serial acquirers doing 
current and past acquisitions in non-block succession. We therefore examine whether or not a 
size effect exists separately for both block and non-block serial deals.  
Table 6 presents average marginal effects for probit regressions for the effect of SIZE 
on serial acquisition likelihood. The dependent variables are binary and equal to one for the 
type of serial acquirer and zero for any other firm; otherwise the regressions are equivalent to 
the one that we presented earlier for serial acquisition likelihood as a whole. Our definition of 
a block deal is such that firms become block serial acquirers based on an elapsed time of no 
more than one year between their current and last acquisitions. Non-block deals therefore 
represent the first acquisitions of non-block serial acquirers for at least one year. On 
deconstructing the total numbers of serial acquisitions and acquirers that we reported earlier, 
there are a total of 4,877 (2,018) block (non-block) deals by 2,408 (1,857) block (non-block) 
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acquirers.12 Block acquisition is therefore the largest subgroup of serial deals/acquirers in our 
sample based on frequency of acquisitions and acquirers. However, in amounting to close to a 
quarter of all acquisitions and not that far off half of all acquirers, non-block acquisition is far 
from being an insignificant subgroup of serial deals/acquirers in our sample.  
The regression results reveal that larger firms are significantly more likely to become 
both block and non-block serial acquirers than smaller firms. Furthermore, the difference 
between the effects of SIZE on block and non-block serial acquisition likelihood fails to gain 
significance to at least the five-percent level. As is the case for SIZE, most of the control 
variables and exclusion restrictions gain significance to at least the five-percent level with 
effects on both block and non-block acquisition likelihood that are generally consistent with 
those we found earlier for serial acquisition likelihood as a whole. However, we find that 
block and non-block serial acquisition likelihood differs significantly along only two 
dimensions. Specifically, compared to all other firms, block acquirers are significantly more 
likely than non-block serial acquirers to have higher market-to-book (Q-) ratios (which we 
found earlier not to have any effect on serial acquisition likelihood as a whole), and to 
operate in an ICB super-sector for which sales concentration is lower. 
Table 7 presents coefficients for both ordinary linear regressions and pseudo sample-
selection models of CAR on SIZE equivalent to those presented earlier for serial acquisition 
as a whole, except that now we add the IMR computed from the first-stage regressions of 
block and non-block acquisition likelihood. As we found earlier for serial acquisition as a 
whole, the sample-selection results reveal that the effect of the IMR on CAR fails to gain 
significance to at least the five-percent level for both block and non-block deals. Furthermore, 
we find that both types of serial deal by larger firms generate significantly less wealth for 
                                                          
12 The numbers of observations in subsequent Tables are less than the totals that we report here because of 
insufficient data to construct certain variables. However, the relative proportions of block and non-block 
serial deals/acquirers remain essentially the same. 
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acquirer stockholders than corresponding acquisitions by smaller firms. Specifically, both of 
the size effects are significant at the one-percent level, as we also found earlier for serial 
acquisition as a whole. For block and non-block deals, the effects on CAR from the control 
variables are also generally consistent with those that we found earlier for serial acquisition 
as a whole. Unsurprisingly, given that the IMR fails to gain significance for both types of 
serial deal, the coefficients and significance levels for SIZE, and for each of the control 
variables, are essentially the same as those in the corresponding ordinary linear regressions. 
These results suggest that, no matter whether we examine serial acquirers as a whole or in 
subgroups, the size effect for serial acquisition is immune to sample-selection bias. 
Furthermore, we added to the ordinary linear regression and pseudo sample-selection 
model for all deals presented in the last columns in Tables 3 and 5, respectively, variables 
that are binary and equal to one for a block deal and zero for a non-block serial deal. The 
coefficients and significance levels for these variables reveal that, no matter SIZE and the 
many control variables, block deals generate insignificantly (to at least the five-percent level) 
less wealth for acquirer stockholders than non-block serial deals. 
5.2.  Firm fixed effects          
 We have thus far utilized the IMR to model unobservable factors as not only 
potentially affecting the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, but also acquisition 
likelihood. That is, we have assumed unobservable factors, conceivably related to potential 
synergies and managerial hubris, are only time-varying. However, unobservable factors may 
also be time-invariant in only affecting the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. Indeed, 
the findings of Golubov et al. (2015) strongly suggest that adding firm fixed effects for serial 
acquirers to ordinary linear regressions of the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders gains 
substantial model explanatory power, as compared to adjusted R-squares in other studies (see, 
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for example, Fuller et al., 2002; Klasa and Stegemoller, 2007) of serial acquisition in which 
these time-invariant controls are omitted.  
Time-invariant, unobservable, factors are also conceivably related to potential 
synergies and managerial hubris, acquisition drivers that are persistent, at least in part, 
because managers can do serial deals either by remaining at the helm of the same firm, or by 
moving to firms in which these drivers already persist as a result of past acquisitions. 
Although the many serial-acquirer characteristics that we include as control variables may 
also proxy for these time-invariant factors, the proxies are unlikely to be sufficiently 
persistent to capture all information about potential synergies and all traits of irrational 
managerial behavior. Our main concern is that serial-acquirer size is correlated with time-
invariant, unobservable, factors explaining a significant percentage of the variation in the 
wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, and to an extent the correlation shows a spurious size 
effect. We therefore account for time-invariant, unobservable, factors in re-estimating the size 
effect for serial acquisition. 
 Table 8 presents coefficients for both an ordinary linear regression and a pseudo 
sample-selection model of CAR on SIZE equivalent to those presented earlier, except that 
now we add firm fixed effects for serial acquirers. Because of these time-invariant controls 
we can only present standard errors in conventional, and non-clustered, form. The total 
numbers of serial deals by the same acquirer range from 2 to 66 in our sample.  
As we found earlier, the sample-selection results reveal that the effect of the IMR on 
CAR fails to gain significance to at least the five-percent level. Furthermore, we still find that 
serial deals by larger firms generate significantly less wealth for acquirer stockholders than 
those by smaller firms. However, although the coefficient for SIZE is also still significant at 
the one-percent level, the predicted size effect is economically larger than that found earlier. 
Specifically, the effect of increasing SIZE by as little as US$ 10 million is now expected to 
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decrease CAR by as much as 1.9 percentage points. A now larger size effect implies that 
SIZE and the time-invariant controls are positively correlated. The correlation is substantial 
enough that in omitting the time-invariant controls, as we have done thus far, the negative 
relationship between CAR and SIZE is shown to be understated rather than spurious.  
Furthermore, adding the firm fixed effects for serial acquirers to the pseudo sample-
selection model gains 13.7 percentage points of explanatory power, as compared to an 
adjusted R-squared of 3.3 percent (presented at the bottom of Table 5) for the corresponding 
model in which we omit these time-invariant controls. Our estimate of the percentage of CAR 
variation explained by the time-invariant controls is more than 2.25 times that of Golubov et 
al. (2015) for serial acquisition as a whole. However, unlike us and Moeller et al. (2004), 
Golubov et al. (2015) include several interaction terms between methods of payment and 
whether the firms being acquired are public, private, or subsidiary firms.       
Surprisingly, in contrast to SIZE, the effects on CAR from the control variables are 
generally consistent with those that we found earlier. That is, the effects on CAR from these 
control variables are largely uncorrelated with the time-invariant controls. The one main 
exception is the effect on CAR from relative (but not absolute) acquisition size, which now 
fails to gain significance to at least the five-percent level. Unsurprisingly, given that the IMR 
fails to gain significance, the coefficient and significance level for SIZE, and for each of the 
control variables, are essentially the same as those in the ordinary linear regression. 
5.3. Distribution of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders 
 We now suspect time-invariant factors (modelled utilizing firm fixed effects) account 
for more of what drives acquisition for serial acquirers, but in particular for larger serial 
acquirers, than unobservable factors that are time-varying (modelled utilizing the IMR). Even 
so, we have no sense of whether or not potential synergies are more likely than managerial 
hubris to be the dominant, time-invariant, unobservable, driver of serial acquisition. However, 
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we have thus far estimated an average size effect, when to understand drivers of serial 
acquisition there is a need to relax the assumption that the size effect is constant in the 
distribution of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders. A coefficient for acquirer size that 
gets more (less) negative in moving from the lowest to the highest quantiles of wealth effects 
for acquirer stockholders would more likely be indicative of potential synergies (managerial 
hubris) as the dominant, persistent, unobservable, driver of serial acquisition. We therefore 
account for the distribution of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders in re-estimating the 
size effect for serial acquisition.        
Table 9 presents coefficients for a pseudo sample-selection model of CAR on SIZE 
equivalent to the one presented earlier for the average size effect for serial acquisition, except 
that now we simultaneously estimate the main relationship of interest for quartiles of wealth 
effects for acquirer stockholders. Therefore, we can only present bootstrapped standard errors 
in non-clustered form and cannot utilize a statistic to gauge overall model significance. CAR 
equals -1.5, 0.3, and 2.5 percent at midpoints in the lower, middle, and upper quartiles of 
wealth effects for acquirer stockholders, respectively. 
As we found earlier for the average size effect for serial acquisition, the sample-
selection results reveal that the effect of the IMR on CAR fails to gain significance to at least 
the five-percent level in all quartiles of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders. Furthermore, 
in all quartiles, we still find that serial deals by larger firms generate less wealth for acquirer 
stockholders than those by smaller firms. However, the coefficient for SIZE gets more 
negative and significant in moving from the lower to the upper quartiles of wealth effects for 
acquirer stockholders. Only in the upper quartile of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders 
are the coefficient and significance level for SIZE equivalent to those that we found earlier 
for the average size effect for serial acquisition. These results suggest that time-invariant 
factors related to potential synergies, more so than those related to managerial hubris, account 
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for more of what in an unobservable sense drives a typical serial acquisition than time-
varying factors. Since this inference comes from the size effect, we also suspect that larger 
serial acquirers are associated with persistent synergies to greater extent than smaller serial 
acquirers. 
The effects on CAR from the control variables are generally consistent with those that 
we found earlier for the average size effect for serial acquisition. However, we find some 
exceptions. In particular, in all quartiles of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders, the effect 
on CAR from relative acquisition size now fails to gain significance to at least the five-
percent level. Similar, but still oppositely, to SIZE, while larger serial deals per se generate 
more wealth for acquirer stockholders than smaller serial deals, the coefficient for absolute 
acquisition size gets more positive and significant in moving from the lower to the upper 
quartiles of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders. Furthermore, we find that some of the 
other control variables now gain significance to at least the five-percent level. Specifically, 
the effect on CAR from a higher Q-ratio is significantly negative (positive) in the lower 
(upper) quartile of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders. A higher leverage ratio and an 
unsolicited deal also have significant negative effects on CAR, but only in the upper quartile 
of wealth effects for acquirer stockholders. 
Our findings suggest a possible connection between a size effect for serial deals and 
hidden, time-invariant, factors related to potential synergies to account for why the size effect 
for serial, unlike for non-serial, acquisition is immune to sample-selection bias (the omission 
of unobservable, time-varying, factors that are also more likely related to potential synergies). 
Furthermore, our findings for serial acquisition suggest reattributions for both the size and 
serial effects away from managerial hubris, for the size effect (see Moeller et al., 2004), and 
managerial self-interest, for the serial effect (see Karolyi et al., 2015), and more consistent 
with rational managerial behavior of a kind construed by Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and 
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Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2009, 2011, 2013). That is, managers become better equipped to 
generate synergies with successive acquisitions. Although these persistent synergies are 
reflected in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, the market also perceives that for 
managers to persist in generating synergies it is rational for them to have to bid ever more 
aggressively.  
Our new findings imply that, no matter other acquirer and deal characteristics and 
unobservable, time-varying, factors also more likely related to potential synergies, this trade-
off in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders is more pronounced for larger, than smaller, 
serial acquirers. Besides the size effect, this rational managerial behavior also potentially 
explains the serial effect because our new findings also imply that, no matter other acquirer 
and deal characteristics, serial acquirers as a whole are associated with persistent synergies, 
and, hence, with the same trade-off in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, to a greater 
extent than time-varying, unobservable synergies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we question why acquisitions by larger firms generate significantly less 
wealth for acquirer stockholders than acquisitions by smaller firms. This seemingly important 
size effect in the literature on corporate acquisitions is typically attributed to stockholder 
expectation that acquisitions by larger firms are more prone to the adverse consequences 
(overpayment in particular) of managerial hubris/self-interest. In contrast to both earlier and 
parallel studies, we not only examine the size effect by disregarding whether or not the same 
firm does acquisitions in relatively close succession (serial or non-serial acquisition), but also 
explore the relationships between the size effect and these different types of acquisition. 
Crucially, we account for the correlation between acquirer size and unobservable factors, like 
potential synergies and managerial hubris/self-interest, jointly affecting acquisition likelihood 
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and the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders. However, we also permit unobservable 
factors and the correlation to be different for serial and non-serial deals. 
We find sample-selection bias results in a spurious size effect for both pooled and 
non-serial deals, but that accounting for unobservable factors and the correlation does not 
affect the size effect for serial deals. Our sample-selection results suggest larger firms have 
more financial and operational capacity for acquisition, but serial acquisition in particular, 
than smaller firms. However, smaller acquirers, but smaller non-serial acquirers in particular, 
require more potential synergies than larger acquirers. By design, these are time-varying 
synergies. Yet, unobservable factors, like potential synergies and managerial hubris/self-
interest, also manifest in persistent form. After adding fixed effects for serial acquirers and 
also simultaneously examining the size effect for serial deals across quartiles of the wealth 
effect for acquirer stockholders, we infer larger serial acquirers are associated with persistent 
synergies to a greater extent than smaller serial acquirers. Moreover, it seems to make no 
difference whether or not serial acquirers have a tendency to do acquisitions in especially 
close succession. 
Our findings for the size effect for both types of deal are consistent with rational 
managerial behavior. That is, with greater uncertainty associated with being a smaller 
acquirer, it is rational for smaller acquirers, but smaller non-serial acquirers in particular, to 
require greater time-varying synergies. In contrast, serial acquirers, but larger serial acquirers 
in particular, become better equipped to generate potential synergies with each successive 
deal. Although this is reflected in the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders, stockholder 
expectation is that persistent synergies also make it rational for serial acquirers, but larger 
serial acquirers in particular, to bid more aggressively with each successive deal. 
Notwithstanding that, all other things equal, this trade-off is most pronounced for larger serial 
acquirers, because we suspect all serial acquirers are affected by it, albeit to different extents, 
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a similar line of reasoning can also potentially explain why, again all other things equal, 
serial deals seem to generate significantly less wealth for acquirer stockholders than non-
serial deals. 
The efficiency of the market for corporate acquisitions can be impeded by many 
factors. Being a relatively large acquirer and a serial acquirer are separate factors long 
identified as potentially important. However, our large-sample analysis of the 
interrelationships between these two factors on the wealth effect for acquirer stockholders 
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Table A1: Definitions for acquirer/firm, deal, and environment characteristics  
This table presents definitions for acquirer/firm, deal, and environment characteristics for the sample of 
acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. 
Acquirer/firm, deal, and 
environment 
characteristics Definition 
CAR Acquirer cumulative abnormal return. Continuously compounded market-model-
adjusted returns for the three trading days centred on the acquisition announcement 
date and estimated from the Datastream database with a FTSE All Share benchmark. 
Market-model parameters are estimated for the period from 302 to 43 trading days 
before the acquisition announcement date. 
SIZE (market value)   Acquirer/firm size. Market value of equity minus book value of equity plus book 
value of total assets from the Datastream database for the fiscal period end before 
the acquisition announcement year. In million dollar units and real (2014) terms. 
SIZE (book value)  Acquirer/firm size. Book value of total assets from the Datastream database for the 
fiscal period end before the acquisition announcement year. In million dollar units 
and real (2014) terms. 
AGE Acquirer/firm age. Acquisition announcement year minus base year in the 
Datastream database (minimum 1964) plus one. 
AGE_MAXIMUM Acquirer/firm maximum age. Binary variable equal to one for AGE equal to the 
acquisition announcement year minus 1964 plus one. 
Q_RATIO Acquirer/firm market to book ratio. Market value of equity minus book value of 
equity plus book value of total assets all divided by book value of total assets from 




Acquirer/firm industry-adjusted market to book ratio. Q_RATIO minus median 
Q_RATIO for the Industry Classification Benchmark super-sector. 
SALES_GROWTH Acquirer/firm growth rate of sales. Average growth rate of sales (annualized and in 
real (2014) terms) from the Datastream database for a maximum of three and 




Acquirer/firm industry-adjusted growth rate of sales. SALES_GROWTH minus 
median SALES_GROWTH for the Industry Classification Benchmark super-sector. 
ROA Acquirer/firm return on assets. Operating income plus depreciation all divided by 
book value of total assets from the Datastream database for the fiscal period end 
before the acquisition announcement year. 
ROA (industry-adjusted)   Acquirer/firm industry-adjusted return on assets. ROA minus median ROA for the 
Industry Classification Benchmark super-sector. 
ROA_VOLATILITY Acquirer/firm volatility of return on assets. Standard deviation of ROA for a 




Acquirer/firm industry-adjusted volatility of return on assets. ROA_VOLATILITY 
minus median ROA_VOLATILITY for the Industry Classification Benchmark 
super-sector. 
LEVERAGE_RATIO Acquirer/firm leverage ratio. Book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
assets from the Datastream database for the fiscal period end before the acquisition 
announcement year. 
LEVERAGE_RATIO       
(industry-adjusted)  
Acquirer/firm industry-adjusted leverage ratio. LEVERAGE_RATIO minus median 
LEVERAGE_RATIO for the Industry Classification Benchmark super-sector. 
 
 
Table A1 (cont.): Definitions for acquirer/firm, deal, and environment characteristics 
Acquirer/firm, deal, and 
environment 
characteristics Definition 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO Acquirer/firm liquidity ratio. Cash and marketable securities divided by book value 
of total assets from the Datastream database for the fiscal period end before the 
acquisition announcement year. 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO         
(industry-adjusted)   
Acquirer/firm industry-adjusted liquidity ratio. LIQUIDITY_RATIO minus median 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO for the Industry Classification Benchmark super-sector.  
SERIAL_DEAL Serial deal. Binary variable for a deal following in the preceding three years at least 
one other acquisition in the SDC Platinum database (meeting criteria as for the 
sample acquisitions) with the same acquirer Datastream database code. 
BLOCK_DEAL Block deal. Binary variable equal to one for a deal following in the preceding year 
at least one other acquisition in the SDC Platinum database (meeting criteria as for 
the sample acquisitions) with the same acquirer Datastream database code.   
DEAL_SIZE Deal size. Deal value times 1
1 ˗ toehold (where toehold is the percentage of the share 
capital of the firm being acquired that is already owned by the acquirer) from the 
SDC Platinum database. In million dollar units and real (2014) terms.    
RELATIVE_SIZE Deal size to acquirer size. Deal value times 1
1 ˗ toehold (where toehold is the percentage 
of the share capital of the firm being acquired that is already owned by the acquirer) 
from the SDC Platinum database divided by market value of equity minus book 
value of equity plus book value of total assets from the Datastream database for the 
fiscal period end before the acquisition announcement year.     
PUBLIC_DEAL  Public deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one for an 
acquisition of a public firm. 
PRIVATE_DEAL Private deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one for an 
acquisition of a private firm.  
SUBSIDIARY_DEAL Subsidiary deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database for an acquisition 
of a subsidiary firm. 
STOCK_DEAL Stock-payment deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one 
for an acquisition paid for all in stock.  
CASH_DEAL Cash-payment deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one 
for an acquisition paid for all in cash. 
MIXED_DEAL Mixed-payment deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one 
for an acquisition paid for in any combination of stock, cash, and other forms.  
DIVERSIFYING_DEAL Diversifying deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one for 
a cross-industry acquisition. 
CROSSBORDER_DEAL Cross-border deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one for 
a cross-country acquisition. 
UNSOLICITED_DEAL Unsolicited deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one for 
an unsolicited acquisition. 
RIVAL_DEAL Rival deal. Binary variable from the SDC Platinum database equal to one for an 
existing rival acquisition attempt. 
SIZE_MEDIAN      
(market value) 
Industry median firm size. Median SIZE (market value) for the Industry 
Classification Benchmark super-sector.   
SIZE_MEDIAN         
(book value) 




Table A1 (cont.): Definitions for acquirer/firm, deal, and environment characteristics 
Acquirer/firm, deal, and 
environment 
characteristics Definition 
AGE_MEDIAN Industry median firm age. Median AGE for the Industry Classification Benchmark 
super-sector. 
AGE_DISPERSION Industry dispersion of firm age. Thiel index for AGE for the Industry Classification 
Benchmark super-sector. 
CONCENTRATION Firm-industry concentration. Herfindahl index for the shares of sales (annualized 
and in decimal units) for the Industry Classification Benchmark super-sector from 
the Datastream database for the fiscal period ends before the acquisition 
announcement year. 
INDUSTRY_DURATION Firm industry deal duration. Number of days (maximum 730) before the acquisition 
announcement year to an acquisition in the SDC Platinum database (meeting criteria 
as for the sample acquisitions except that deals with DEAL_SIZE less than ten 
million dollars are excluded) for the Industry Classification Benchmark super-
sector.  
INDUSTRY_INTENSITY Firm industry deal intensity. Total number of deals divided by number of firms and 
multiplied by aggregate DEAL_SIZE divided by aggregate SIZE (market value) for 
the Industry Classification Benchmark super-sector and acquisition announcement 
year.                 
INDUSTRY_WAVE Firm industry deal wave. Binary variable equal to one for 
INDUSTRY_INTENSITY at least one standard deviation above the average 
INDUSTRY_INTENSITY for the Industry Classification Benchmark super-sectors.   
DEAL_INTENSITY Deal intensity. Total number of deals divided by number of firms and multiplied by 
aggregate DEAL_SIZE divided by aggregate SIZE (market value) for the 
acquisition announcement year.      
DEAL_WAVE Deal wave. Binary variable equal to one for DEAL_INTENSITY at least one 
standard deviation above the average DEAL_INTENSITY.     
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics for firm and environment characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for firm and environment characteristics for the sample of acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are at 
the level of the firm and acquisition announcement year. Firm and environment characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. $$, $ indicate statistical significance 
of mean (median) differences in firm and environment characteristics between acquirers and non-acquirers at the one- and five-percent levels respectively. 
Firm and environment 
characteristics 



















SIZE (market value)  3,849.0 
(168.5) 
16,425.9 34,735 5,271.4$$ 
(421.0)$$ 
19,072.6 6,408 3,527.2 
(137.7) 
15,748.2 28,327 
SIZE (book value)  2,539.4 
(108.2) 
10,915.3 36,573 3,390.2$$ 
(240.4)$$ 





12.5 42,251 16.4$$ 
(12.0)$$ 
13.0 7,171 13.5 
(9.0) 
12.3 35,080 
AGE_MAXIMUM 0.106 0.308 42,251 0.167$$ 0.373 7,171 0.094 0.292 35,080 
Q_RATIO  2.040 
(1.371) 
2.264 34,731 2.019 
(1.501)$$ 







2.175 34,731 0.516$ 
(0.071)$$ 





1.403 29,866 0.446 
(0.149)$$ 







1.617 33,114 0.303 
(0.020)$$ 





0.393 36,049 0.050$$ 
(0.090)$$ 
0.262 6,550 -0.058 
(0.053) 
0.414 29,499 
ROA (industry-adjusted) -0.082 
(0.000) 
0.378 36,049 -0.011$$ 
(0.015)$$ 
0.255 6,550 -0.098 
(-0.004) 
0.398 29,499 
ROA_VOLATILITY  0.151 
(0.039) 
0.394 32,089 0.102$$ 
(0.028)$$ 




(industry-adjusted)    
0.100 
(0.000) 
0.387 32,089 0.057$$ 
(-0.004)$$ 





Table A2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics for firm and environment characteristics 
Firm and environment 
characteristics 





















0.211 36,526 0.190 
(0.158)$$ 
0.179 6,607 0.192 
(0.139) 
0.218 29,919 




0.205 36,526 0.033$$ 
(0.002)$ 
0.168 6,607 0.052 
(0.000) 
0.212 29,919 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO  0.169 
(0.089) 
0.209 35,853 0.147$$ 
(0.084)$$ 
0.178 6,457 0.174 
(0.091) 
0.215 29,396 




0.196 35,853 0.049$$ 
(0.000) 
0.170 6,457 0.066 
(0.000) 
0.201 29,396 




1,441.1 42,244 497.1$$ 
(195.8)$$ 







1,115.0 42,247 367.2$$ 
(119.2)$$ 





2.5 42,251 9.9$$ 
(10.0) 





0.094 42,251 0.339 
(0.336) 





0.133 42,251 0.121$$ 
(0.080)$$ 





303.4 42,251 550.4$$ 
(730.0) 
295.0 7,171 522.4 
(730.0) 
304.9 35,080 
INDUSTRY_INTENSITY 2.612  
(0.317) 
12.646 42,251 3.641 $$ 
(0.620)$$ 
15.440 7,171 2.402 
 (0.291) 
11.984 35,080 
INDUSTRY_WAVE 0.180 0.384 42,251 0.247$$ 0.431 7,171 0.166 0.372 35,080 
DEAL_INTENSITY 0.215 
(0.169) 
0.158 42,251 0.259$$ 
(0.214)$$ 
0.169 7,171 0.206 
(0.169) 
0.154 35,080 
DEAL_WAVE 0.255 0.436 42,251 0.361$$ 0.480 7,171 0.233 0.423 35,080 
 
 
Table A3: Alternative sample-selection models for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
This table presents alternative sample-selection models for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the 
sample of acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. Sample-selection models are the same as those in Table 5 
except for the following changes. In Panel A, ln(SIZE) (market value) and ln(SIZE_MEDIAN) (market value) are 
replaced with ln(SIZE) (book value) and ln(SIZE_MEDIAN) (book value) respectively. Inverse Mills ratios are 
from a corresponding probit regression the same as that in Table 4 except for this variable replacement. SIZE 
(book value) and SIZE_MEDIAN (book value) are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. In Panel B, acquirer 
CARs are continuously compounded market-adjusted returns for the three trading days centred on the acquisition 
announcement date. In Panel C, Inverse Mills ratios are from a corresponding probit regression the same as that in 
Table 4 except that the probit regression for serial acquirers (non-serial acquirers) does not pool firms in the same 
acquisition announcement year that are non-serial acquirers (serial acquirers) with non-acquirers. In Panel D, 
bootstrapping of standard errors is replaced with Heckman maximum-likelihood estimates. For reasons of brevity 
only selected acquirer and deal characteristics (and no constant) are displayed in each Panel. **, * indicate 
statistical significance of coefficients and Wald statistics at the one- and five-percent levels respectively. 
Panel A: SIZE (book value) 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Acquirer CARs 








Inverse Mills ratio 0.0019 (0.0065) 0.1809** (0.0546) 0.0298* (0.0128) 
BLOCK_DEAL -0.0012 (0.0016)     
SERIAL_DEAL     -0.0094** (0.0021) 
ln(SIZE) (book value) -0.0039** (0.0009) -0.0024 (0.0024) -0.0021 (0.0014) 
Wald statistic 198.1** 139.5** 279.6** 
Adjusted-R2 3.2 6.4 4.8 
No. of observations 5,465 2,124 7,589 
Panel B: Market-adjusted CARs 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Acquirer CARs 








Inverse Mills ratio -0.0009 (0.0067) 0.1915** (0.0544) 0.0287* (0.0130) 
BLOCK_DEAL 0.0004 (0.0016)     
SERIAL_DEAL     -0.0083** (0.0021) 
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0045** (0.0009) -0.0021 (0.0023) -0.0023 (0.0013) 
Wald statistic 206.1** 155.3** 262.0** 
Adjusted-R2 3.1 7.0 3.8 
No. of observations 5,465 2,124 7,589 
 
 
Table A3 (cont.): Alternative sample-selection models for acquirer cumulative abnormal 
returns 
Panel C: Inverse Mills ratios without pooling 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Acquirer CARs 
Serial deals Non-serial deals 
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.0004 (0.0066) 0.1635** (0.0472) 
BLOCK_DEAL -0.0011 (0.0016)   
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0042** (0.0009) -0.0002 (0.0025) 
Wald statistic 197.6** 157.7** 
Adjusted-R2 3.3 7.0 
No. of observations 5,465 2,124 
Panel D: Heckman estimates 




Coefficient Standard error 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.1992** (0.0668) 
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0029 (0.0026) 
Wald statistic 123.4** 
No. of observations 2,124 
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Table 1: Sample of acquisitions and firms 
This table presents the sample of acquisitions and firms by showing the annual frequency, aggregate size, and intensity of acquisitions announced by UK listed firms during 
the period 1989-2014. Acquisitions are from the SDC Platinum database and comprised of domestic and cross-border deals for public, private, and subsidiary firms that 
involve the purchase of at least 50 percent of the share capital and end in outright ownership. Deals with a size (deal value times 1
1 ˗ toehold
 , where toehold is the percentage of 
the share capital of the firm being acquired that is already owned by the acquirer) less than one million dollars in real (2014) terms, deals with a size of less than one percent 
of the market value of the acquirer (where the market value of the acquirer is the market value of equity minus book value of equity plus book value of total assets for the 
fiscal period end before the acquisition announcement year), and acquisitions by or for firms in financial and utility industies are excluded. Acquisitions are merged with the 
annual population of listed firms reconstructed from live and dead constituents of the Datastream database after excluding financials and utilities. Serial deals follow in the 
preceding three years at least one other acquisition (meeting criteria as for the sample acquisitions) with the same acquirer Datastream code. Non-serial deals are the 
remaining deals. Firms can do (multiple) serial deals and non-serial deals in the same acquisition announcement year. Firm size is the market value of equity minus book 
value of equity plus book value of total assets for the fiscal period end before the acquisition announcement year. Aggregate size of deals and firms are in trillion dollar units 





































1989 156 81 6.7 332 32.5 488 324 39.2 1,128 2,745.2 0.618 
1990 229 137 18.3 171 20.2 400 278 38.5 1,153 3,179.4 0.421 
1991 179 114 20.5 93 7.8 272 194 28.3 1,161 2,791.8 0.238 
1992 188 115 18.1 83 7.2 271 184 25.3 1,169 3,668.9 0.160 
1993 213 138 13.4 120 3.8 333 242 17.2 1,248 3,812.2 0.120 
1994 275 175 14.3 131 13.0 406 279 27.4 1,338 3,754.2 0.221 
1995 271 172 27.7 127 8.0 398 283 35.6 1,465 3,896.1 0.248 
1996 305 196 9.7 161 14.2 466 334 23.9 1,624 4,265.1 0.161 
1997 441 253 34.5 203 16.5 644 418 51.0 1,730 4,553.9 0.417 
1998 500 288 31.9 190 21.4 690 444 53.4 1,762 5,135.5 0.407 
1999 486 297 66.5 156 22.3 642 414 88.8 1,726 5,293.6 0.624 
2000 483 282 43.2 178 17.8 661 429 61.0 1,797 5,643.8 0.398 
2001 334 217 34.8 138 9.0 472 336 43.7 1,765 5,548.0 0.211 
2002 245 164 39.5 111 15.1 356 262 54.6 1,760 5,165.9 0.214 
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2003 199 130 33.2 89 7.0 288 209 40.1 1,736 4,841.6 0.138 
2004 260 169 41.3 123 6.8 383 266 48.1 1,837 5,195.8 0.193 
2005 284 170 39.5 189 14.2 473 331 53.7 2,040 5,505.9 0.226 
2006 333 212 26.7 180 19.2 513 360 46.0 2,114 6,593.8 0.169 
2007 403 239 32.9 131 6.7 534 346 39.6 2,100 6,591.8 0.153 
2008 222 144 20.1 86 10.7 308 219 30.8 1,982 7,386.8 0.065 
2009 120 81 12.1 60 3.8 180 135 16.0 1,789 7,098.8 0.023 
2010 165 99 24.9 87 9.8 252 175 34.7 1,658 5,581.4 0.095 
2011 146 92 15.0 102 19.5 248 184 34.5 1,580 6,355.6 0.085 
2012 132 89 13.5 72 3.1 204 155 16.6 1,532 6,229.8 0.036 
2013 153 97 13.8 82 3.4 235 171 17.3 1,517 6,305.5 0.042 
2014 173 114 10.5 94 10.8 267 199 21.2 1,540 6,554.4 0.056 
Total 6,895 4,265 662.6 3,489 324.0 10,384 7,171 986.6 42,251 133,694.3 0.181 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for acquirer and deal characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for acquirer and deal characteristics for the sample of acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are at the 
level of the deal. Acquirer and deal characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. $$, $ indicate statistical significance of mean (median) differences in acquirer and 
deal characteristics between serial deals and non-serial deals at the one- and five-percent levels respectively.  
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 






























SIZE (market value)  8,561.9$$ 
(806.4)$$ 
32,354.7 6,433 5,946.0 
(237.6) 
27,115.3 2,818 7,765.1 
(596.1) 
30,875.1 9,251 
SIZE (book value)  4,252.0$ 
(382.3)$$ 
17,596.4 6,518 3,320.9 
(128.4) 





13.2 6,849 13.8 
(9.0) 
12.4 3,453 16.6 
(12.0) 
13.1 10,302 
AGE_MAXIMUM 0.003 0.055 6,895 0.002 0.048 3,489 0.003 0.053 10,384 
Q_RATIO 2.067 
(1.586)$$ 
1.770 6,433 2.079 
(1.447) 







1.801 6,433 0.520 
(-0.021) 





1.676 6,209 0.412 
(0.119) 







1.674 6,209 0.251 
(-0.026) 





0.151 6,493 0.031 
(0.083) 
0.235 2,959 0.067 
(0.093) 
0.183 9,452 
ROA (industry-adjusted) 0.016$$ 
(0.021)$$ 
0.155 6,493 -0.039 
(0.001) 





0.179 5,840 0.113 
(0.034) 





Table 2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics for acquirer and deal characteristics 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 























0.180 5,840 0.071 
(0.000) 
0.247 2,389 0.041 
(-0.007) 
0.202 8,229 
LEVERAGE_RATIO 0.202$$  
(0.177)$$ 
0.165 6,514 0.176 
(0.131) 
0.183 3,000 0.194 
(0.164) 
0.171 9,514 




0.174 6,514 0.026 
(-0.015) 





0.138 6,389 0.175 
(0.093) 
0.208 2,931 0.141 
(0.085) 
0.165 9,320 




0.148 6,389 0.082 
(0.012) 
0.213 2,931 0.045 
(0.000) 
0.173 9,320 
DEAL_SIZE  101.4 
(16.6)$$ 
325.9 6,895 100.9 
(14.3) 





0.268 6,433 0.230 
(0.067) 
0.446 2,818 0.145 
(0.035) 
0.337 9,251 
PUBLIC_DEAL 0.061$$ 0.239 6,895 0.092 0.289 3,489 0.071 0.258 10,384 
PRIVATE_DEAL 0.601$$ 0.490 6,895 0.569 0.495 3,489 0.590 0.492 10,384 
SUBSIDIARY_DEAL 0.338 0.473 6,895 0.339 0.474 3,489 0.338 0.473 10,384 
STOCK_DEAL 0.292$$ 0.455 6,895 0.333 0.471 3,489 0.306 0.461 10,384 
CASH_DEAL 0.482$$ 0.500 6,895 0.394 0.489 3,489 0.453 0.498 10,384 
MIXED_DEAL 0.147$$ 0.355 6,895 0.174 0.379 3,489 0.156 0.363 10,384 
DIVERSIFYING_DEAL 0.515 0.500 6,895 0.503 0.500 3,489 0.511 0.500 10,384 
CROSSBORDER_DEAL 0.330$$ 0.470 6,895 0.273 0.445 3,489 0.311 0.463 10,384 
UNSOLICITED_DEAL 0.003$ 0.051 6,895 0.005 0.072 3,489 0.003 0.059 10,384 
RIVAL_DEAL 0.006 0.074 6,895 0.005 0.074 3,489 0.005 0.074 10,384 
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Table 3: Linear regressions for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
This table presents linear regressions for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the sample of 
acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. Linear regressions are at the level of the deal. Acquirer CARs and 
other acquirer and deal characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Linear regressions include 
Industry Classification Benchmark super-sectors and acquisition announcement years. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped (with 2,000 replications) and clustered at the level of the acquirer. **, * indicate statistical 
significance of coefficients and Wald statistics at the one- and five-percent levels respectively. 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Acquirer CARs 








BLOCK_DEAL -0.0011 (0.0015)     
SERIAL_DEAL     -0.0093** (0.0021) 
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0042** (0.0007) -0.0051* (0.0021) -0.0043** (0.0009) 
AGE 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0002* (0.0001) 
AGE_MAXIMUM 0.0014 (0.0091) -0.0300 (0.0212) -0.0050 (0.0087) 
Q_RATIO           
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0002 (0.0010) 0.0024 (0.0038) 0.0014 (0.0015) 
SALES_GROWTH 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0018 (0.0012) 0.0005 (0.0021) -0.0015 (0.0011) 
ROA (industry-adjusted) 0.0057 (0.0133) -0.0405 (0.0243) -0.0181 (0.0149) 
ROA_VOLATILITY 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0037 (0.0055) -0.0189 (0.0230) -0.0069 (0.0086) 
LEVERAGE_RATIO      
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0067 (0.0057) 0.0097 (0.0180) -0.0026 (0.0069) 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO      
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0065 (0.0068) -0.0369 (0.0190) -0.0163 (0.0083) 
ln(DEAL_SIZE) 0.0035** (0.0008) 0.0019 (0.0020) 0.0028** (0.0008) 
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.0128* (0.0059) 0.0263 (0.0191) 0.0087 (0.0103) 
PRIVATE_DEAL 0.0215** (0.0043) 0.0261** (0.0072) 0.0248** (0.0042) 
SUBSIDIARY_DEAL 0.0251** (0.0042) 0.0195** (0.0074) 0.0252** (0.0041) 
CASH_DEAL 0.0005 (0.0015) 0.0021 (0.0044) 0.0007 (0.0017) 
MIXED_DEAL 0.0001 (0.0026) 0.0088 (0.0100) 0.0018 (0.0036) 
DIVERSIFYING_DEAL 0.0009 (0.0014) 0.0021 (0.0042) 0.0014 (0.0015) 
CROSSBORDER_DEAL 0.0010 (0.0017) 0.0041 (0.0046) 0.0021 (0.0018) 
UNSOLICITED_DEAL -0.0400 (0.0211) -0.0073 (0.0145) -0.0279* (0.0123) 
RIVAL_DEAL -0.0075 (0.0104) -0.0013 (0.0181) -0.0068 (0.0084) 
Constant -0.0044 (0.0084) -0.0106 (0.0187) -0.0060 (0.0021) 
Wald statistic 204.5** 148.3** 276.9** 
Adjusted-R2 3.4 5.9 3.9 
No. of observations 5,465 2,124 7,589 
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Table 4: Probit regressions for acquisition likelihood 
This table presents probit regressions for acquisition likelihood for the sample of acquisitions and firms described 
in Table 1. Probit regressions are at the level of the firm and acquisition announcement year. Acquisition 
likelihood is a binary variable equal to one for a firm that is an acquirer in the acquisition announcement year. The 
probit regression for serial acquirers (non-serial acquirers) pools firms in the same acquisition announcement year 
that are non-serial acquirers (serial acquirers) with non-acquirers. Firm and environment characteristics are 
defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard errors are bootstrapped (with 2,000 replications) and clustered at 
the level of the firm. **, * indicate statistical significance of average marginal effects and Wald statistics at the 
one- and five-percent levels respectively. $$, $ indicate statistical significance of average marginal effect 
differences in firm and environment characteristics between serial acquirers and non-serial acquirers at the one- 
and five-percent levels respectively. 
Firm and environment 
characteristics  
Acquisition likelihood 
















ln(SIZE) (market value) 0.0255**,$$ (0.0020) 0.0020** (0.0007) 0.0273** (0.0021) 
AGE 0.0002 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0004) 
AGE_MAXIMUM -0.0010 (0.0125) 0.0174** (0.0045) 0.0149 (0.0139) 
Q_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0029 (0.0018) 0.0011 (0.0009) 0.0045* (0.0019) 
SALES_GROWTH 
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0077**,$$ (0.0014) -0.0025 (0.0013) 0.0047** (0.0017) 
ROA (industry-adjusted) 0.0966**,$$ (0.0179) 0.0259** (0.0062) 0.0936** (0.0140) 
ROA_VOLATILITY 
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0024 (0.0097) 0.0100* (0.0046) 0.0185* (0.0093) 
LEVERAGE_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0798**,$ (0.0169) -0.0272** (0.0081) -0.1018** (0.0177) 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0859**,$$ (0.0197) 0.0402** (0.0090) -0.0244 (0.0191) 
ln(SIZE_MEDIAN) 
(market value) 
-0.0015 (0.0044) 0.0023 (0.0017) -0.0015 (0.0047) 
AGE_MEDIAN 0.0023** (0.0008) 0.0006 (0.0004) 0.0027** (0.0009) 
AGE_DISPERSION 0.2006**,$$ (0.0434) 0.0125 (0.0216) 0.2003** (0.0472) 
CONCENTRATION -0.1765**,$$ (0.0342) -0.0104 (0.0111) -0.1673** (0.0321) 
INDUSTRY_DURATION 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000* (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
INDUSTRY_WAVE 0.0348**,$$ (0.0061) 0.0020 (0.0043) 0.0384** (0.0071) 
DEAL_WAVE 0.0410** (0.0054) 0.0297 (0.0035) 0.0671** (0.0062) 
Constant 0.1238**,$$ (0.0035) 0.0686** (0.0013) 0.1892** (0.0037) 
Wald statistic 599.1** 275.7** 740.3** 
Pseudo-R2  7.7 1.6 5.6 
No. of observations 28,633 28,633 28,633 
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Table 5: Sample-selection models for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
This table presents sample-selection models for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the sample of 
acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. Sample-selection models are at the level of the deal. Inverse Mills 
ratios for the acquisition announcement year are from the corresponding probit regression in Table 4. Acquirer 
CARs and other acquirer and deal characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Sample-selection 
models include Industry Classification Benchmark super-sectors and acquisition announcement years. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped (with 2,000 replications) and clustered at the level of the acquirer. **, * indicate statistical 
significance of coefficients and Wald statistics at the one- and five-percent levels respectively. 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Acquirer CARs 








Inverse Mills ratio 0.0001 (0.0067) 0.1849** (0.0547) 0.0303* (0.0126) 
BLOCK_DEAL -0.0011 (0.0016)     
SERIAL_DEAL     -0.0090** (0.0021) 
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0042** (0.0009) -0.0019 (0.0022) -0.0020 (0.0013) 
AGE 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0004* (0.0002) 0.0002* (0.0001) 
AGE_MAXIMUM 0.0014 (0.0092) -0.0277 (0.0222) -0.0051 (0.0084) 
Q_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0002 (0.0010) 0.0025 (0.0039) 0.0017 (0.0015) 
SALES_GROWTH 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0018 (0.0012) -0.0025 (0.0022) -0.0011 (0.0011) 
ROA (industry-adjusted) 0.0057 (0.0125) -0.0026 (0.0198) -0.0061 (0.0129) 
ROA_VOLATILITY 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0037 (0.0054) -0.0015 (0.0212) -0.0045 (0.0080) 
LEVERAGE_RATIO 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0067 (0.0058) -0.0140 (0.0169) -0.0106 (0.0070) 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0066 (0.0070) 0.0080 (0.0190) -0.0194* (0.0084) 
ln(DEAL_SIZE) 0.0035** (0.0008) 0.0021 (0.0019) 0.0029** (0.0008) 
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.0128* (0.0058) 0.0267 (0.0189) 0.0079 (0.0102) 
PRIVATE_DEAL 0.0215** (0.0044) 0.0266** (0.0075) 0.0252** (0.0041) 
SUBSIDIARY_DEAL 0.0251** (0.0043) 0.0203** (0.0076) 0.0255** (0.0040) 
CASH_DEAL 0.0005 (0.0015) 0.0017 (0.0044) 0.0007 (0.0016) 
MIXED_DEAL 0.0001 (0.0026) 0.0086 (0.0097) 0.0019 (0.0037) 
DIVERSIFYING_DEAL 0.0009 (0.0014) 0.0032 (0.0043) 0.0017 (0.0016) 
CROSSBORDER_DEAL 0.0010 (0.0017) 0.0012 (0.0047) 0.0019 (0.0018) 
UNSOLICITED_DEAL -0.0400 (0.0205) -0.0059 (0.0140) -0.0288* (0.0118) 
RIVAL_DEAL -0.0075 (0.0103) -0.0085 (0.0179) -0.0073 (0.0086) 
Constant -0.0047 (0.0165) -0.3449** (0.1048) -0.0574* (0.0242) 
Wald statistic 209.2** 144.9** 283.8** 
Adjusted-R2 3.3 7.0 4.1 
No. of observations 5,465 2,124 7,589 
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Table 6: Probit regressions for block and non-block serial-acquisition likelihood 
This table presents probit regressions for block and non-block serial-acquisition likelihood for the sample of 
acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. Probit regressions are at the level of the firm and acquisition 
announcement year. Block (non-block) serial-acquisition likelihood is a binary variable equal to one for a firm 
that is a block acquirer (non-block acquirer) in the acquisition announcement year. The probit regression for block 
acquirers (non-block acquirers) pools firms in the same acquisition announcement year that are non-block 
acquirers (block acquirers) and non-serial acquirers with non-acquirers. Block deals follow in the preceding year 
at least one other acquisition in the SDC Platinum database (meeting criteria as for the sample acquisitions) with 
the same acquirer Datastream database code. Non-block deals are the remaining serial deals. Firms can do 
(multiple) block deals and non-block deals in the same acquisition announcement year. Block deals (acquirers) 
number 4,877 (2,408) and non-block deals (acquirers) number 2,018 (1,857). Firm and environment 
characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Standard errors are bootstrapped (with 2,000 
replications) and clustered at the level of the firm. **, * indicate statistical significance of average marginal effects 
and Wald statistics at the one- and five-percent levels respectively. $$, $ indicate statistical significance of average 
marginal effect differences in firm and environment characteristics between block acquirers and non-block 
acquirers at the one- and five-percent levels respectively. 
Firm and environment 
characteristics 
Block and non-block serial-acquisition likelihood 
Block acquirers  Non-block acquirers  
Average 
marginal effect Standard error 
Average 
marginal effect Standard error 
ln(SIZE) (market value) 0.0147** (0.0014) 0.0111** (0.0010) 
AGE 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0002) 
AGE_MAXIMUM -0.0056 (0.0086) 0.0039 (0.0061) 
Q_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0037**,$$ (0.0012) -0.0014 (0.0011) 
SALES_GROWTH 
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0051** (0.0011) 0.0025** (0.0009) 
ROA (industry-adjusted) 0.0701** (0.0143) 0.0375** (0.0109) 
ROA_VOLATILITY 
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0002 (0.0076) 0.0019 (0.0058) 
LEVERAGE_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0336** (0.0121) -0.0472** (0.0094) 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0545** (0.0145) -0.0347** (0.0117) 
ln(SIZE_MEDIAN) 
(market value) 
-0.0018 (0.0031) 0.0004 (0.0024) 
AGE_MEDIAN 0.0016** (0.0006) 0.0008 (0.0005) 
AGE_DISPERSION 0.1366** (0.0315) 0.0712** (0.0258) 
CONCENTRATION -0.1339**,$$ (0.0246) -0.0579** (0.0178) 
INDUSTRY_DURATION 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
INDUSTRY_WAVE 0.0207** (0.0044) 0.0133** (0.0042) 
DEAL_WAVE 0.0263** (0.0042) 0.0165** (0.0037) 
Constant 0.0680** (0.0024 0.0577** (0.0018) 
Wald statistic 470.4** 382.4** 
Pseudo-R2  7.3 4.6 
No. of observations 28,633 28,633 
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Table 7: Linear regressions and sample-selection models for block and non-block serial-acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
This table presents linear regressions and sample-selection models for block and non-block serial-acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the sample of 
acquisitions and firms described in Table 1. Linear regressions and sample-selection models are at the level of the deal. Inverse Mills ratios for the acquisition 
announcement year are from the corresponding probit regression in Table 6. Block and non-block serial acquirers and deals are described in Table 6 and acquirer CARs and 
other acquirer and deal characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. Linear regressions and sample-selection models include Industry Classification Benchmark 
super-sectors and acquisition announcement years. Standard errors are bootstrapped (with 2,000 replications) and clustered at the level of the acquirer. **, * indicate 
statistical significance of coefficients and Wald statistics at the one- and five-percent levels respectively. 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Block and non-block serial-acquirer CARs 
Linear regressions Sample-selection models 










Inverse Mills ratio     0.0029 (0.0065) -0.0049 (0.0187) 
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0038** (0.0008) -0.0049** (0.0013) -0.0036** (0.0009) -0.0053** (0.0020) 
AGE 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 
AGE_MAXIMUM -0.0021 (0.0106) 0.0045 (0.0149) -0.0021 (0.0105) 0.0048 (0.0155) 
Q_RATIO  
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0004 (0.0012) -0.0010 (0.0014) 0.0004 (0.0013) -0.0010 (0.0014) 
SALES_GROWTH 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0014 (0.0013) -0.0031 (0.0028) -0.0013 (0.0014) -0.0032 (0.0027) 
ROA (industry-adjusted) 0.0067 (0.0182) 0.0023 (0.0135) 0.0087 (0.0181) 0.0007 (0.0142) 
ROA_VOLATILITY 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0080 (0.0071) 0.0063 (0.0104) -0.0080 (0.0072) 0.0062 (0.0106) 
LEVERAGE_RATIO 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0073 (0.0068) -0.0034 (0.0101) -0.0080 (0.0072) -0.0018 (0.0118) 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0057 (0.0081) -0.0076 (0.0128) -0.0069 (0.0082) -0.0062 (0.0136) 
ln(DEAL_SIZE) 0.0041** (0.0009) 0.0026* (0.0012) 0.0041** (0.0009) 0.0026* (0.0012) 
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.0126 (0.0078) -0.0117 (0.0086) -0.0127 (0.0079) -0.0115 (0.0087) 
PRIVATE_DEAL 0.0218** (0.0056) 0.0215** (0.0072) 0.0219** (0.0055) 0.0215** (0.0071) 
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Table 7 (cont.): Linear regressions and sample-selection models for block and non-block serial-acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Block and non-block serial-acquirer CARs 
Linear regressions Sample-selection models 










SUBSIDIARY_DEAL 0.0258** (0.0056) 0.0243** (0.0072) 0.0258** (0.0056) 0.0243** (0.0072) 
CASH_DEAL 0.0019 (0.0018) -0.0019 (0.0030) 0.0020 (0.0018) -0.0019 (0.0029) 
MIXED_DEAL 0.0018 (0.0031) -0.0045 (0.0050) 0.0019 (0.0031) -0.0044 (0.0050) 
DIVERSIFYING_DEAL 0.0003 (0.0016) 0.0024 (0.0028) 0.0003 (0.0017) 0.0024 (0.0029) 
CROSSBORDER_DEAL -0.0009 (0.0020) 0.0044 (0.0031) -0.0009 (0.0020) 0.0044 (0.0030) 
UNSOLICITED_DEAL -0.0522 (0.0290) -0.0113 (0.0191) -0.0522 (0.0282) -0.0111 (0.0191) 
RIVAL_DEAL -0.0071 (0.0099) -0.0110 (0.0226) -0.0071 (0.0096) -0.0109 (0.0224) 
Constant -0.0075** (0.0103) -0.0096 (0.0146) -0.0144 (0.0184) 0.0021 (0.0486) 
Wald statistic 167.7** 126.8** 157.4** 129.1** 
Adjusted-R2 2.7 4.4 2.7 4.3 
No. of observations 3,719 1,746 3,719 1,746 
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Table 8: Linear regression and sample-selection model for serial-acquirer cumulative 
abnormal returns with fixed effects for deals by the same firm 
This table presents a linear regression and sample-selection model for serial-acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) with fixed effects for deals by the same firm for the sample of acquisitions and firms described in Table 
1. The linear regression and sample-selection model are at the level of the deal. Inverse Mills ratios for the 
acquisition announcement year are from the probit regression for serial acquirers in Table 4. Acquirer CARs and 
other acquirer and deal characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the Appendix. The linear regression and sample-
selection model also include Industry Classification Benchmark super-sectors and acquisition announcement 
years. **, * indicate statistical significance of coefficients and F-statistics at the one- and five-percent levels 
respectively.  
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Serial-acquirer CARs 
Linear regression Sample-selection model 
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
Inverse Mills ratio   -0.0107 (0.0170) 
BLOCK_DEAL -0.0013 (0.0018) -0.0013 (0.0018) 
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0069** (0.0026) -0.0082** (0.0029) 
AGE 0.0006 (0.0004) 0.0007 (0.0004) 
AGE_MAXIMUM -0.0022 (0.0099) -0.0020 (0.0098) 
Q_RATIO 
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0029 (0.0016) 0.0028 (0.0016) 
SALES_GROWTH 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0008 (0.0022) -0.0012 (0.0023) 
ROA (industry-adjusted) -0.0202 (0.0217) -0.0250 (0.0204) 
ROA_VOLATILITY 
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0097 (0.0118) 0.0086 (0.0117) 
LEVERAGE_RATIO 
(industry-adjusted) 
0.0060 (0.0148) 0.0098 (0.0141) 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO 
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0165 (0.0124) -0.0133 (0.0129) 
ln(DEAL_SIZE) 0.0033** (0.0010) 0.0033** (0.0010) 
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.0118 (0.0087) -0.0117 (0.0087) 
PRIVATE_DEAL 0.0241** (0.0050) 0.0241** (0.0050) 
SUBSIDIARY_DEAL 0.0282** (0.0051) 0.0282** (0.0051) 
CASH_DEAL 0.0014 (0.0019) 0.0014 (0.0019) 
MIXED_DEAL 0.0022 (0.0034) 0.0022 (0.0034) 
DIVERSIFYING_DEAL 0.0030 (0.0019) 0.0030 (0.0019) 
CROSSBORDER_DEAL 0.0006 (0.0020) 0.0006 (0.0020) 
UNSOLICITED_DEAL -0.0246 (0.0190) -0.0243 (0.0191) 
RIVAL_DEAL -0.0065 (0.0133) -0.0065 (0.0134) 
Constant -0.0143 (0.0201) 0.0110 (0.0410) 
F-statistic 1.9** 1.9** 
Adjusted-R2 17.0 17.0 
No. of observations 5,465 5,465 
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Table 9: Sample-selection model with simultaneous-quartile regressions for serial-acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
This table presents a sample-selection model with simultaneous-quartile regressions for serial-acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the sample of acquisitions 
and firms described in Table 1. The sample-selection model with simultaneous-quartile regressions is at the level of the deal. Inverse Mills ratios for the acquisition 
announcement year are from the probit regression for serial acquirers in Table 4. Acquirer CARs and other acquirer and deal characteristics are defined in Table A1 of the 
Appendix. The sample-selection model with simultaneous-quartile regressions also includes Industry Classification Benchmark super-sectors and acquisition announcement 
years. Standard errors are bootstrapped (with 2,000 replications). **, * indicate statistical significance of coefficients at the one- and five-percent levels respectively.  
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Serial-acquirer CARs 
Lower quartile (CAR = -0.015) Middle quartile (CAR = 0.003) Upper quartile (CAR = 0.025) 
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.0029 (0.0049) 0.0035 (0.0035) -0.0048 (0.0067) 
ln(SIZE) (market value) -0.0011 (0.0008) -0.0013* (0.0005) -0.0045** (0.0009) 
AGE 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0001) 
AGE_MAXIMUM 0.0043 (0.0074) 0.0013 (0.0078) 0.0000 (0.0116) 
Q_RATIO         
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0015* (0.0007) -0.0001 (0.0005) 0.0018* (0.0009) 
SALES_GROWTH  
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0010 (0.0012) -0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0006 (0.0009) 
ROA (industry-adjusted) 0.0133 (0.0068) 0.0078 (0.0048) 0.0017 (0.0103) 
ROA_VOLATILITY  
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0049 (0.0053) 0.0043 (0.0040) 0.0077 (0.0062) 
LEVERAGE_RATIO      
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0011 (0.0042) -0.0062 (0.0032) -0.0182** (0.0063) 
LIQUIDITY_RATIO      
(industry-adjusted) 
-0.0019 (0.0054) -0.0031 (0.0037) -0.0075 (0.0078) 
ln(DEAL_SIZE) 0.0005 (0.0006) 0.0019** (0.0004) 0.0043** (0.0007) 
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.0127 (0.0074) -0.0024 (0.0031) 0.0016 (0.0074) 
PRIVATE_DEAL 0.0204** (0.0060) 0.0098** (0.0029) 0.0121** (0.0044) 
SUBSIDIARY_DEAL 0.0216** (0.0060) 0.0111** (0.0028) 0.0134** (0.0045) 
CASH_DEAL 0.0020 (0.0013) 0.0002 (0.0010) -0.0003 (0.0017) 
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Table 9 (cont.): Sample-selection model with simultaneous-quartile regressions for serial-acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
Acquirer and deal 
characteristics 
Serial-acquirer CARs 
Lower quartile (CAR = -0.015) Middle quartile (CAR = 0.003) Upper quartile (CAR = 0.025) 
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
MIXED_DEAL 0.0010 (0.0022) -0.0009 (0.0015) -0.0001 (0.0030) 
DIVERSIFYING_DEAL 0.0020 (0.0012) 0.0014 (0.0009) -0.0003 (0.0017) 
CROSSBORDER_DEAL -0.0005 (0.0013) 0.0015 (0.0009) 0.0024 (0.0016) 
UNSOLICITED_DEAL -0.0285 (0.0398) -0.0171 (0.0210) -0.0419** (0.0159) 
RIVAL_DEAL 0.0018 (0.0177) -0.0112 (0.0069) -0.0093 (0.0127) 
Constant -0.0362** (0.0133) -0.0202* (0.0093) 0.0228 (0.0167) 
Pseudo-R2 2.8 1.5 4.1 
No. of observations 2,364 2,363 2,364 
 
 
